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Abstract
We analyze intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement in a developing country where information asymmetry
between a foreign multinational and domestic consumers gives rise to the need for signaling by the multinational.
The signaling distorts the multinational’s entry decision even when IPR enforcement is perfect. Our analysis derives
implications consistent with empirical observations: better IPR enforcement encourages the multinational’s entry
but exhibits an inverse U-shaped relation with their incentives to develop new technologies. Compared with perfect
enforcement, moderatelyweakIPRenforcement, whichdoesnot fullydetercopycatsfromstealingthemultinational’s
technology,canbeneﬁtboththehostcountryandthemultinational. Ouranalysisthusshedsnewlight intoIPRpolicies
in developing countries and cautions policy implications drawn from empirical studies.
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1 Introduction
As per conventional wisdom, stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement in developing countries can help
protect the proﬁts of foreign multinationals, which in turn encourages technology transfer that ultimately beneﬁts
developing countries themselves. This argument is based on an implicit premise. That is, once developing countries
perfect their IPR enforcement, there is nothing else to obstruct technology transfer by foreign companies. Such a
premise is, of course, miles away from the reality of developing countries where many forms of market imperfections
∗Jiahua Che: Department of Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong; Larry Qiu: School of Economics and Finance,
University of Hong Kong, Pofuklum Road, Hong Kong; Wen Zhou (corresponding author, wzhou@business.hku.hk): School of Business, Uni-
versity of Hong Kong, Pofuklum Road, Hong Kong. We are grateful for helpful comments from Chong-en Bai, Hongbin Cai, Jacques Cremer,
Tanjim Houssain, Zhigang Tao, Cheng Wang, Yong Wang, Li-An Zhou and seminar participants at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, City University
of Hong Kong and the Third Asia-Paciﬁc Trade Seminars (Shanghai).
1are present besides weak IPR enforcement. More often than not, these market imperfections prevent multinationals
from entering a country regardless of its IPR enforcement strength.
Examplesaboundwhereforeignﬁrmswithheldfromenteringadevelopingcountryuntiltheircopycatsfoundmuch
success in the market. In fact, such a pattern often leads to contention between developing countries and multinationals
about the loss of multinationals as a result of IPR violation: Multinationals would maintain that products and services
provided by copycats amount to loss of proﬁtable opportunities; developing countries argue that these products and
services wouldnot havebeenofferedin themarkethad therenot beencopycats. Acase inpointis Starbucks. Starbucks
did not begin operation in mainland China on a large scale until 2000, when it ﬁled a lawsuit against a copycat, Xing
Ba Ke, a Chinese chain of coffee shops, which by the time of the lawsuit had enjoyed great success in Shanghai, the
largest metropolitan city in China.1
Thus comes the question of whether conventional wisdom remains valid in such a second best environment where
the market is imperfect. When market imperfection prevents a multinational from entering a market, the vacuum
creates a potential for efﬁciency gain, which can be materialized if local ﬁrms can make use of the technology by,
say, stealing it. While this seems to justify weak IPR enforcement that allows IPR violations, without addressing
three questions, the argument remains shallow and is in no position to refute conventional wisdom. First, how will
the presence of a copycat affect the foreign multinational’s behavior in the market? If the copycat causes a further
retreat by the multinational, there certainly will be a loss of social welfare as stealing a technology is likely to be a
less efﬁcient form of technology transfer than, say, licensing. Second, if there is efﬁciency gain to be realized under
weak IPR enforcement, why cannot such a gain be captured under strong IPR enforcement by means of contracting
between the multinational and its copycats?2 In the Starbucks case, why could not have Starbucks licensed its China
business to Xing Ba Ke? Finally, how will the proﬁts of the multinational be affected by the presence of a copycat?
Even if stealing generates efﬁciency gains, it may do so at the expense of the multinational. As conventional wisdom
rightly suggests, if multinationals’ interest cannot be protected, developing countries may stand to lose as well.
This paper thus revisits the issue of IPR enforcement in developing countries by addressing the three questions in
a setting with some form of market imperfection. We show that by allowing copycats, weak IPR enforcement indeed
forces a further retreat by a multinational from a developing country; however, the social gains from having a copycat
serving the otherwise unserved market always outweigh the social loss of the further retreat by the multinational. We
also demonstrate that the very form of market imperfection that causes a multinational to withhold its entry may also
1Judging by the success of Xing Ba Ke, Chinese urban consumers apparently have the appetite as well as the wallet for coffee, to which Starbucks
did not respond initially. Starbucks’ lack of response cannot be accounted for by the lax IPR enforcement in China. Given the nature of the coffee
shop business, it is hardly believable that the sheer presence of a copycat would have exhausted all proﬁtable opportunities. Neither can it be argued
that Starbucks withheld from the Chinese market to protect its business secret, as its business model was copied despite its absence. The Starbucks
case thus clearly points to some form of market failure. And Starbucks is just one of many examples of delayed entry by multinationals into China.
Colgate did not enter China until 1991, a whole 13 years after China started its economic reform. Haagen-Dazs entered China in 1996, nine years
later than Nestle, which sells ice cream of much lower prestige.
2Much of the existing literature on IPR enforcement avoids this question by simply assuming away the possibility of contracting.
2discourage it from contracting with a local copycat regardless of the enforcement strength. As a result, the efﬁciency
gain attained under weak IPR enforcement cannot be replicated by contracting under strong IPR enforcement. Finally,
we show that the gains brought by copycats can be shared by the multinational and, as a result, moderately weak IPR
enforcement may beneﬁt the multinational as well.
The particular form of market imperfection that we assume in our model, which we deem to be especially relevant
for a developing country, is information asymmetry between local customers and foreign ﬁr m sw i t hr e g a r dt ot h e
quality of foreign products. Take China for example. While some well-established international brands such as Coca
Cola, Ford, and Seiko have long been household names, many others have been virtually unknown to most Chinese
until recently, and even more still remain outside Chinese customers’ knowledge. Starbucks was certainly a no-name
among most Chinese before it ﬁled the lawsuit against Xing Ba Ke. Chinese consumers do not recognize either eBay or
Amazon, according to a publication from China’s Ministry of Commerce.3 A recent survey conducted by MasterCard
Worldwideshowed thatwhilean increasingnumber of luxury brands havebecomepopularinChina, somelocalbrands
enjoyed more recognition than more prestigious global brands.4
With this particular form of market imperfection in mind, we tell the following story. A multinational contemplates
entering a developing country with a technology of two possible qualities, which is ap r i o r iunknown to local con-
sumers. The multinational can choose two ways to enter: direct investment by itself or licensing through some local
ﬁrms. While direct investment allows the multinational to maintain its product quality, due to limited technological
capacity of local ﬁrms, licensing can only deliver low quality products even if the quality of the technology is high.
Applying the story to emerging markets where we think our analysis is most relevant, we envision a growing economy
over two periods. The market size was initially small and grows only some time later, making direct investment prof-
itable only in the second period. Given the information asymmetry, the multinational has a concern for its reputation
in choosing its ﬁrst period action that will shape consumers’ perception of its product quality in the second period.
While a low-quality multinational will license to the entire market, a high-quality multinational licenses to only part
of the market in an attempt to signal its type, leaving the remaining part unserved.5
Depending on the strength of IPR enforcement, the vacuum left by the high-type multinational may then be ﬁlled
by local ﬁrms through stealing. With positive probability, which represents the strength of IPR enforcement, the
stealing is caught, in which case the copycat must turn over all its revenues to the multinational. Thus, local ﬁrms
will not steal when the enforcement probability surpasses a certain threshold (hence strong), but will do so when the
3China International Business, June 2007, available at http://www.cibmagazine.com.cn/features/showatl.asp?id=128.
4According to an article in Forbes, Feb. 21, 2008 (http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/21/china-luxury-survey-markets-equity-
cx_jc_0221markets02.html), more top spenders in China identify Chow Tai Fook, a Hong Kong jewelry retailer, than they do Cartier.
5While in theory ﬁrms may signal their qualities through advertising, they are not always able to do so in reality. Producers of lower quality
products can often launch a large and equally impressive advertising campaign. A case in point is Amway, a U.S. based direct sale company which
has been selling nutrient supplements, cook ware, cosmetics and personal care products in China. Judging by the scale of its advertising campaign
on its nutrient products as compared to that made by Centrum, a ﬁrm specializing in multivitamin supplements with better quality, local Chinese
consumers can hardly differentiate Anway from Centrum quality-wise.
3probability falls below (hence weak). Although it withholds from entering some part of the market regardless of the
enforcement strength, the multinational enters the market more aggressively under strong IPR than under weak IPR.
Compared with strong enforcement, weak enforcement thus presents the multinational with the following trade-off.
On the one hand, the multinational must give up a larger part of the market and face competition from local imitation
in the part of the market it does enter. On the other, it can beneﬁt from stealing in the part of the market that it chooses
to ignore, as IPR enforcement imposes a transfer from the copycat with positive probability.6 Our analysis shows that
when the enforcement is moderately weak, the multinational earns more proﬁts than it does under strong enforcement.
However, the trade-off goes the other way and the multinational earns less proﬁts when the enforcement becomes
excessively weak.
Our analysis has the implication that should it be costly for the multinational to develop a technology for the
developing country in the ﬁrst place, the multinational’s propensity to develop such a technology will be reduced
when the enforcement becomes excessively strong or excessively weak, hence an inverted U-shape relation between
IPR enforcement in the South and the development of technology in the North that is speciﬁcally targeted at the South.
This is consistent with empirical studies by Scherer (1967) and Aghion, et al. (2005), who demonstrate an inverted U-
shape relation between innovation and competition (or imitation). Meanwhile, our analysis also suggests that stronger
IPR enforcement encourages entry, which is consistent with the works by Maskus and Penubarti (1995), Branstetter,
et al (2006), Branstetter, et al (2007) and Du, et al (2008), who show that countries with better IPR enforcement, as
well as regions with better IPR enforcement within a country, tend to attract a larger scale of entry and technology
transfer by foreign multinationals. Thus, one of the key contributions of this paper is to offer a coherent analysis that
helps tie the two sets of empirical evidence.
The implication of our analysis, that some imitation is good for innovation, resonates that of Aghion, et al (2001)
and Aghion, et al (2005), but our argument works through a different mechanism. In those two papers, imitation may
encourage innovation because incumbent ﬁrms try to “escape competition”. Stronger imitation (due to weaker IPR
enforcement, for example) increases incremental proﬁts of innovation even though it reduces the absolute proﬁts of
incumbent ﬁrms. In our paper, imitation encourages outside ﬁrms to innovate by increasing both the incremental and
the absolute proﬁts. In this respect, our analysis is better positioned in explaining the aforementioned entry phenomena
of foreign multinationals into developing countries.
Bessen and Maskin (2007) also stress the importance of market failure in understanding the role of IPR enforce-
ment. They demonstrate that if technologies display externalities that cannot be internalized through contracts, strong
6Compensations made by copycats can be substantial. In June 2007, China’s Supreme People’s Court awarded Japan’s Yamaha Motor Co
damages of 8.3 million yuan (US$1.16 million) for a trademark infringement by Zhejiang Huatian, one of the largest Chinese motorcycle makers.
In June 2003, General Motors accused Chery, a Chinese car manufacturer, of copying a model manufactured by its Korean subsidiary, GM Daewoo,
and asked for a total of 80 million yuan (US$10 million) for damages and costs. In another case, Toyota ﬁled a lawsuit against Geely, another
fast-growing Chinese car maker, for trademark infringement and unfair competition. Toyota asked for a total of 14 million yuan (US$1.77 million)
for damages.
4IPR protection can slow down rather than facilitate technological progress. Such an observation offers a powerful
explanation of why certain sectors, such as the information technology industry, have been able to ﬂourish in de-
veloped countries without resorting to strong IPR protection. Insightful as it is, the argument is less applicable for
understanding IPR enforcement in the South, which has highly asymmetric technological competence. In this regard,
our work, focusing on a different form of market failure which we deem particularly relevant for developing countries,
complements Bessen and Maskin (2007). Furthermore, different from their model, we allow for contracting despite
market failure.
Helpman (1993) also argues that weak IPR protection in the South can be welfare enhancing. His argument
focuses on division of labor between the North and the South. Enabled by weak IPR enforcement, imitation allows
the South to make use of technologies developed in the North, which in turn allows the North to concentrate its
resources in innovation rather than in production. One implicit assumption in Helpman’s analysis, however, is that
technology transfer is infeasible through either licensing or direct investment.7 To make a clear distinction from this
line of literature, we choose a partial equilibrium approach, thus leaving aside the reallocation effect completely. Our
emphasis is not on how imitation in all or most Southern countries can raise the overall level of innovation in the
North. Instead, we focus on how such imitation, enabled by relatively weak IPR enforcement in a single developing
country, has the potential of increasing proﬁtability of Northern ﬁrms that speciﬁcally target the Southern country
itself. In doing so, our analysis is able to match the aforementioned empirical evidence from country-level studies.
There are two additional differences between our paper and this literature. First, instead of allowing either investment
or licensing, our analysis incorporates both actions as possible modes of entry by a foreign multinational. Second, we
do not exogenously impose a cost on contracting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up our two-period model. Section 3 ana-
lyzes the second period outcome, followed by Section 4 that analyzes the ﬁrst period and establishes the equilibrium.
In Sections 5 and 6, we provide two extensions to relax some of the assumptions in the main model. Section 7 provides
our conclusions.
2M o d e l
Consider a market in a developing country that consists of a continuum of segments of s measure. Each segment
is inhabited by one domestic ﬁrm (D) and unit mass of consumers, who have unit demand for a product in each
of two periods. A foreign multinational (M) possesses the technology to deliver the product. There are two types
7Following Helpman’s work, a number of studies (for example, Lai 1998, Yang and Maskus 2001, Glass and Saggi 2002) became involved in the
debate of whether imitation in the South can facilitate innovation in the North. While these studies make various assumptions about either licensing
or direct investment, they share their focus on the resource reallocation effect as highlighted in Helpman (1993).
5of M differentiated by the quality of the technology: high (Mh)a n dl o w( Ml). The quality of the ﬁnal product,
however, depends on the entry mode. In each segment and in each period, Mi (i = h,l) can enter either through direct
investment or by licensing its technology to D.I fMi enters through direct investment, it is able to deliver the product
in its genuine quality, in which case a consumer will derive a utility ui with uh >u l.I fMi enters through licensing,
the product quality is always low due to limited technological capacity of D and, as a result, a consumer will derive a
utility ul regardless of Mi’s type.8
Although yielding higher utility to consumers, direct investment can be more costly than licensing. To capture the
idea that direct investment by a foreign multinational may be too costly at the early stage of economic development,
we introduce a market-wide ﬁxed cost in the case of direct investment. For expositional simplicity, we assume that
the ﬁxed cost equals k per period for both types of M. Although this ﬁxed cost may include advertising for brand
recognition, we do not model it as an expenditure that can differentiate M’s type. Although it seems reasonable
to envision a higher ﬁxed cost when the multinational enters the country for the ﬁrst time, doing so will not affect
the qualitative results of our analysis and we therefore assume a constant ﬁxed cost across the two periods. To further
simplifyour model, we assume that once the ﬁxed cost is incurred, Mi pays zero extracost in servingeachsegment. To
capture the idea that M’s entry choice matters for the future, we assume a growing economy so that direct investment
becomes proﬁtable in the second period:9
s1uh <k<s 2ul, (1)
in which sj is the market size in period j (j =1 ,2). The ﬁrst inequality says that it is not proﬁtable for Mh (let alone
for Ml)t oi n v e s ti nt h eﬁrst period, whereas the second states that it is indeed proﬁtable for Ml (and hence for Mh as
well) to invest in the second period.
To allow for maximal contracting possibility, we assume that there is no market-wide ﬁxed cost in licensing and
hence Mi is able to license segment by segment regardless of the scale of its entry. Nevertheless, to manage licensing
in each segment, Mi has to incur a cost ci. We think of ci as the expenditure needed for negotiating and administering
the technology transfer. Because Mi has to divert its company resources, it is reasonable to assume that ci represents a
larger opportunity cost for Mh than for Ml, i.e., ch >c l, even though their ﬁnal product quality is the same. Although
it will be crucial to our analysis in the current setting, this assumption can be relaxed without altering any of our major
8Whiletheassumption that licensing delivers thesame product quality regardless ofM’s technology is a simplifying assumption, the assumption
that licensing may not deliver the genuine quality is realistic. In the recent scandal in China about milk products tainted with melamine, an industrial
chemical that causes kidney problems, both local brands (Sanlu, Mengniu, Yili and Bright) and foreign brands produced in China (Nestle, M&M)
have been found to contain the chemical. For foreign companies, the problem of product quality is less severe in direct investment than in licensing
or joint ventures (The Economist, Sept.25, 2008, “The poison spreads”): “Foreign companies have been concerned about the possibility of such a
scandal for some time. Unilever dumped its joint ventures years ago, to ensure it had full control of all domestic Chinese operations. McDonald’s
has created its own closed supply chain, spanning beef, fries, bread and pickles. Coca-Cola imposes stringent rules on suppliers of sugar, water and
carbon dioxide.”
9This assumption, together with the assumption that licensing delivers the same low quality, ensures a reputation-building story to be told here.
That is, it is the second-period price, not the ﬁrst-period price, that M’s ﬁrst-period action is designed to inﬂuence.
6results when we use a slightly different set-up.10
There are two ways by which D may obtain M’s technology: licensing and stealing. Aside from the licensing fee,
D incurs no extra cost in producing and delivering the product if it obtains the technology through licensing. In the
case of stealing, however, D has to expend a stealing cost d in order to acquire the know-how and D is able to steal
whether or not M enters the market.11 As in the case of licensing, we assume that the product quality is always low in
stealing regardless of the quality of the technology. To make sure that stealing can be proﬁtable but at the same time
is a less efﬁcient form of technology transfer, we assume that
ul >d>c h. (2)
Together, the ﬁrst inequality of condition (1) and the second inequality of condition (2) imply that licensing is
the most efﬁcient form of making use of Mi’s technology in the ﬁrst period. The next assumption suggests that in
the second period when the market size grows large enough, direct investment has the potential (when Mi enters all
segments) to become the most efﬁcient form of utilizing Mi’s technology:
k<s 2cl. (3)
The sequence of moves is as follows. First, Nature determines M’s type. The ap r i o r iprobability that M = Mh is
ρ0. Afterwards, in each period and in each segment, M moves ﬁrst by choosing between direct investment, licensing,
or withholding (i.e., staying away from the segment). If it chooses licensing, M gives D a take-it-or-leave-it offer,
which allows D to use the technology at a fee, f.A f t e rM’s choice, D moves. Facing a licensing offer, D may accept
and commit to not stealing (in that period). Alternatively, D may reject the offer, in which case M can no longer take
up investment in that period.12 Whenever D is not a licensee (i.e., when M invests, withholds, or offers a licensing
contract that is rejected), D may steal M’s technology. When both D and M operate in a segment, they engage in
Bertrand competition.
Whether or not D steals depends, among other things, upon the strength of IPR enforcement, which is carried out
at the end of each period. The enforcement strength is embodied in γ, the probability that D is caught for stealing. We
allow γ to differ across the two periods. Once caught, D must transfer to M its revenue from stealing. D and M are
10For example, if Mh can make use of information from the ﬁrst-period activities to adapt its technology while Ml is not able to do so due to its
inferior technology, the qualitative results of our analysis hold even when ch = cl. Alternatively, the cost ch and cl can be incurred by D rather
than by M. In that case, the interpretation for ch >c l is that the local ﬁrm has to exert a larger effort and expenditure in order to learn a more
sophisticated technology.
11As the Starbucks case illustrates, local ﬁrms in a developing country are often able to steal foreign multinationals’ technologies before the latter
enter their market.
12Maybe because investment has to be done at the beginning of each period.
7risk neutral with a common time discount factor δ. Hence, stealing in period j (j =1 ,2)g i v e sD a maximal (when
it does not face competition from M’s investment) expected payoff of (1 − γj)ul − d in that period. To simplify our
analysis, we assume that enforcement is independent across the two periods; that is, catching D stealing in the ﬁrst
period will not prevent it from stealing again in the second. Accordingly, D will steal in period j only if
γj <γ 0 ≡ 1 −
d
ul
.
The enforcement in period j is said to be strong if γj >γ 0 a n dw e a ko t h e r w i s e .
With full information, i.e., M’s type is known to all parties, the following will happen in equilibrium. In the ﬁrst
period, Mi will license to D in each segment at a fee of ul if γ1 >γ 0 and γ1ul + d if γ1 ≤ γ0, which is accepted
by D. In the second period, Mi will invest in each segment and set the price of its product at ui if γ2 >γ 0 and at
(ui − ul)+d if γ2 ≤ γ0,a n dD will not steal in either case. No stealing takes place in equilibrium. Weakening
IPR enforcement will not affect social surplus, but it reduces the multinational’s payoff, which inevitably dampens
innovations. Conventional wisdom is justiﬁed in such a setting.
Things will be different when information is asymmetric. As motivated in the Introduction, consumers in a de-
veloping country are often unaware of the quality of a foreign multinational’s technology. Our model thus assumes
that M’s type is unknown and its licensing cost is unobservable. Except these two, everything else is observable to
consumers.13 Based on their observations, consumers update their beliefs concerning Mi’s type al aBayesian. We
denote ρ1
i as consumers’ belief in the ﬁrst period that Mi (i = l,h) is the high type, and ρ2
i as the corresponding belief
in the second period.
The rest of our analysis focuses on the comparison between weak and strong IPR enforcement under such informa-
tion asymmetry. To highlight this comparison, we ﬁx the second period enforcement to be strong while analyzing two
scenarios, in which the ﬁrst period enforcement is either strong or weak. Whenever possible, we apply the intuitive
criterion to reﬁne the equilibrium. In case of multiple equilibria that are Pareto rankable, we assume that players will
coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium.
3 Second Period: Strong IPR Enforcement
Throughout the entire paper, we assume that enforcement in the second period is strong (γ2 >γ 0). Given that D never
steals in the second period, if Mi invests, its revenue is ρ2
iuh +( 1− ρ2
i)ul in each segment where it invests. If Mi
licenses, it sets the license fee at f = ul and earns ul − ci in each segment. Suppose that Mi invests in x2
i segments
13M’s type is irrelevant to D. Our analysis remains the same even if D observes M’s type.
8and licenses to y2
i segments (x2
i + y2
i ≤ s2). Its second-period proﬁti s
π2
i = x2
i[ρ2
iuh +( 1− ρ2
i)ul] − k + y2
i(ul − ci).
Lemma 1 In the second period, both types of M invest in all segments regardless of what happens in the ﬁrst period.
The lemma implies that the two types of M would take the same action in the second period and therefore Mh is
unable to signal its type using the second period’s action. If the two types of M are already separated by the end of
the ﬁrst period, there is no need to distort their second-period choices, so both invest in all segments. If they are not
separated by the end of the ﬁrst period, it is impossible for Mh to signal its type by distorting its second-period choice.
The reason is as follows. The high type’s investment in the second period is more valuable than the low type’s, so the
high type has an incentive to differentiate itself from the low type. Recall that the undistorted choice for both types in
the second period is to invest in all segments. If Mh wants to signal its type, it can do so only by withholding or by
switching to licensing in some segments. Because Mh and Ml differ only in their costs of licensing, withholding does
not work. Because it is more costly for Mh to license than for Ml to do so, if Mh ﬁnds it proﬁtable to signal its type
by switching to licensing in some segments, it must be even more proﬁtable for Ml to do the same thing and pretend to
be the high type. Therefore, the two types must remain pooled. In fact, there exists a continuum of pooling outcomes
in which both types invest in some segments and license in some or all of the remaining segments. The Pareto efﬁcient
outcome is for both types to invest in all segments, which, by our equilibrium selection criterion, is the equilibrium
outcome.
Lemma 1 implies that consumers’ second-period belief must remain the same as their ﬁrst-period belief, i.e.,
ρ2
i = ρ1
i. Thus, we can rewrite Mi’s proﬁt in the second period as:
π2
i = s2[ρ1
iuh +( 1− ρ1
i)ul] − k. (4)
Note that if the two types are separated in the ﬁrst period, ρ1
h =1and ρ1
l =0 .
4 First Period: Strong versus Weak IPR Enforcement
4.1 Strong Enforcement
W en o wm o v eb a c kt ot h eﬁrst period. In this subsection we consider the case in which IPR enforcement in the ﬁrst
period is strong (γ1 >γ 0). The alternative case of weak enforcement will be analyzed in the next subsection. Recall
9that investment is unproﬁtable in the ﬁrst period, and that Mh and Ml differ only in their licensing costs. Therefore, if
Mh wants to signal its type, it will do so by switching from licensing to withholding (in some segments), and not by
investment. Accordingly, Mi has only one choice to make in the ﬁrst period: license in y1
i (≤ s1) segments and hence
withholding from the remaining s1 − y1
i segments. As explained in the previous section, when IPR enforcement is
strong, Mi’s license payoff is ul −ci per segment. Consider a possible pooling equilibrium in which both types of M
license in y1 ≤ s1 segments in the ﬁrst period. Mi’s two-period total proﬁti s
πi(y1,ρ 1
i)=y1(ul − ci)+δ{s2[ρ1
iuh +( 1− ρ1
i)ul] − k}. (5)
Proposition 1 Suppose that IPR enforcement in the ﬁrst period is strong. If
s1
s2 >δ
uh − ul
ul − cl
, (6)
there exists auniqueequilibriumwhere, in theﬁrstperiod, Mh withholds fromsomesegments (y1
h = s1−
δs2(uh−ul)
ul−cl <
s1) while Ml licenses to all segments (y1
l = s1) and, in the second period, both types invest in all segments.
Proposition 1 says that when the second-period market size is not very large, Mh withholds from entering some
segments in the ﬁrst period while Ml licenses in all segments. The intuition is as follows. As per Lemma 1, signaling
is possible only in the ﬁrst period, and it takes the form of withholding from entering some segments. The signaling
works because withholding imposes a larger cost to the low type (ul − cl per segment) than to the high type (ul − ch
per segment). By withholding from a right measure of segments, Mh can garner the beneﬁt of being regarded as the
high type in the second period without being mimicked by Ml. Note that Ml does not mimic Mh only when the beneﬁt
of being regarded as the high type is not very large, and hence the condition that the second-period market size should
not be too large.
By Proposition 1, Mh’ se n t r yi nt h eﬁrst period will not be complete if the market does not grow too fast. Recall
that efﬁcient entry requires both types of M to license in all segments in the ﬁrst period. Incomplete entry reduces
social welfare, which provides room for possible welfare improvement when stealing takes place under weaker IPR
enforcement. Furthermore, because Mh can recover some of the lost income in the withheld segments through IPR
enforcement, it may also beneﬁt from weak IPR enforcement. This will be analyzed next.
4.2 Weak Enforcement
Now suppose that the ﬁrst-period IPR enforcement is weak (γ1 ≤ γ0). Stealing then becomes proﬁtable for D,
which affects Mi’s payoffs and hence optimal choices. In the ﬁrst period, if Mi stays away from a segment, D will
10steal and Mi’s expected proﬁti sγ1ul.I f Mi licenses to D, Mi has to leave enough surplus for D lest it steals,
i.e., (1 − γ1)ul − d = ul − f, which means f = γ1ul + d. Mi’s payoff is therefore γ1ul + d − ci. Since d>
ci, licensing dominates withholding. Recall that withholding dominates investment in the ﬁrst period under strong
enforcement. When enforcement is weak, the return to withholding increases (from zero to positive), whereas the
return to investment decreases because Mi has to lower its price to compete with D.14 Thus, withholding continues to
dominate investment in the ﬁrst period under weak enforcement, which again implies that investment will not be used.
Consider a possible pooling equilibrium in which both types of M license in y1 segments in the ﬁrst period. Mi’s
two-period total proﬁti s
πi(y1,ρ 1
i)=y1(γ1ul + d − ci)+( s1 − y1)γ1ul + δπ2
i
= y1(d − ci)+s1γ1ul + δ{s2[ρ1
iuh +( 1− ρ1
i)ul] − k}. (7)
Compared with expression (5), which is Mi’s proﬁt under strong enforcement, (7) has d in place of ul in the ﬁrst term
and has an extra ﬁxed term s1γ1ul that does not affect the choice of y1. By similar proof as in Proposition 1, which is
omitted, we have:
Proposition 2 Suppose that IPR enforcement in the ﬁrst period is weak. If
s1
s2 >δ
uh − ul
d − cl
, (8)
there exists a unique separating equilibrium where, in the ﬁrst period, Mh withholds from some segments (y1
h =
s1 −
δs
2(uh−ul)
d−cl <s 1) while Ml licenses to all segments (y1
l = s1) and, in the second period, both types invest in all
segments.
Proposition 2 is similar to Proposition 1. Note that condition (8) implies condition (6). That is, whenever Mh can
separate itself from Ml under weak enforcement, it can also do so under strong enforcement.
14If Mi invests in a segment, it will compete with D al aBertrand. D’s expected proﬁt will be (1 − γ1)q − d when it is able to sell its product
at price q,a n dD breaks even when q ≥ d
1−γ1 . For any belief ρ1
i, Mi enjoys (weak) quality advantage (ρ1
iuh +( 1− ρ1
i)ul ≥ ul)o v e rD,b u t
its cost is higher than D ( k
s1 >u h > d
1−γ1 ). Therefore, either Mi is able to price pi low enough to force D out of the market, or D is able
to force Mi out of the market. In the former case, Mi will charge a price pi such that consumers are indifferent between Mi’s and D’s products:
ρ1
iuh +( 1− ρ1
i)ul − pi = ul − d
1−γ1 .S i n c eul − d
1−γ1 > 0,w eh a v eρ1
iuh +( 1− ρ1
i)ul >p i.T h a ti s ,Mi’s per-segment investment
revenue in the ﬁrst period under weak enforcement, which is pi, is smaller than that under strong enforcement, which is ρ1
iuh +( 1− ρ1
i)ul.
114.3 Strong versus Weak Enforcement: The Comparison
We are now ready to compare weak enforcement with strong enforcement in the ﬁrst period while maintaining strong
enforcement in the second period. The performance of four variables will be discussed: scale of entry, social surplus,
multinational’s payoff, and the incentive to innovate. We focus on the case in which the equilibrium is separating
under both strong and weak enforcement, i.e., condition (8) is satisﬁed, which we assume for the remainder of the
paper.15 Given this condition, the IPR strength in the ﬁrst period does not affect either type’s entry choice, payoff or
social surplus in the second period.
¥ Scale of ﬁrst-period entry
From Propositions 1 and 2, Ml enters all segments in the ﬁrst period regardless of the enforcement strength, while
Mh enters more segments under strong enforcement (the withholding is
δs2(uh−ul)
ul−cl ) than under weak enforcement (the
withholding is
δs
2(uh−ul)
d−cl ). The reason for Mh’s behavior is as follows. The scale of withholding is chosen to prevent
Ml from mimicking; as such it is inversely related to Ml’s per-segment opportunity cost of withholding. Under strong
enforcement, the opportunity cost is ul −cl,w h i c hi sMl’s proﬁt in each licensed segment. Under weak enforcement,
the opportunity cost is reduced, as Ml’s licensing proﬁt is lower and it receives some compensation from D.M o r e
speciﬁcally, Ml loses the licensing proﬁt γul + d − cl but gains γul through D’s stealing payment. The net loss is
d−cl, which is smaller than ul−cl. Because Ml’s opportunity cost of withholding is smaller under weak enforcement
than under strong enforcement, Mh has to withhold from more segments under weak enforcement.
The conclusion that better enforcement encourages entry and technology transfer roughly matches empirical ob-
servations (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Branstetter, et al, 2006; Branstetter, et al, 2007; and Du, et al, 2008). Two
caveats are noted, however. First, the empirical ﬁndings can be a combined result of the entry/transfer decisions of
multinationals for any given technology they have already developed, and their decisions to develop these technologies
in the ﬁrst place. Both decisions should be affected by IPR enforcement in the developing country. The above match
ignores the second effect, which will be discussed explicitly later in this subsection. Second, the theoretical prediction
matches empirical observations only roughly, as the comparison is between the strong and weak enforcement regimes.
Within each regime, Mh’s entry scale remains the same regardless of the value of γ1. An analysis that better matches
the empirical ﬁndings should yield a ﬁrst-period entry by Mh that is increasing in γ1 even within the regime of weak
and strong enforcement. Such an analysis will come later in Section 5.
¥ Social surplus
Although our analysis generates positive predictions consistent with the empirical ﬁndings, its normative implica-
tion differs from conventional wisdom, which is often believed to be supported by these empirical observations. Under
strong enforcement, the high type withholds from
δs2(uh−ul)
ul−cl segments, which are not served by the local ﬁrm. Thus,
15When condition (8) is not satisﬁed, there will be pooling equilibrium in which both types of M w i t h h o l di nt h eﬁrst period. We can show that
the welfare comparison between strong and weak enforcement still holds, while the payoff comparison holds under some conditions.
12the loss of social surplus in each of these segments is ul − ch, and the total loss (as compared with the ﬁr s tb e s to f
licensing in all segments) is
δs2(uh − ul)
ul − ch
ul − cl
.
Under weak enforcement, the segments that Mh withdraws from are now served by D through stealing, so the per-
segment loss of social surplus becomes d − ch, which is smaller than that under strong enforcement. However, the
scale of withholding under weak enforcement,
δs2(uh−ul)
d−cl , is larger. Thus, there appears to be a trade-off between
weak and strong enforcement. It turns out, however, that weak enforcement always yields a smaller loss. To see this,
note that the total loss of social surplus under weak enforcement is
δs2(uh − ul)
d − ch
d − cl
,
which is evidently smaller than the loss under strong enforcement. The intuition is as follows. The total loss of social
surplus is the per-segment loss of social surplus (i.e., society’s opportunity cost of withholding) multiplied by the scale
of withholding, which is inversely related to Ml’s per-segment opportunity cost of withholding. When enforcement
changes from strong to weak, society’s opportunity cost andMl’s opportunity cost are both reduced, but since society’s
opportunity cost (related to ch)i sa l w a y ss m a l l e rt h a nMl’s opportunity cost (related to cl), the reduction has a larger
impact on society’s opportunity cost than on Ml’s opportunity cost. The net effect is that the total loss of social surplus
is reduced.
Proposition 3 Weak enforcement in the ﬁrst period generates more social surplus than does strong enforcement in the
ﬁrst period.
On the surface, the conclusion that weak enforcement generates more social surplus seems trivial. After all, IPR
protection is supposed to be a cost that society has to pay (in the form of monopoly power in the product market) in
order toprovidesufﬁcientincentivefortechnology innovation. Suchamonopoly power is typicallydistortionaryunder
downward-sloping demand and an inability to perfectly price discriminate. If a technology has already been invented,
weakening IPR protection undermines the technology owner’s monopoly power in the product market and should
consequently lead to higher social surplus. In our model, however, the demand function is assumed to be perfectly
inelastic. Hence, monopoly power by itself does not hurt social welfare. If information is symmetric, multinationals
will never withhold from any segment. The ﬁrst best outcome will always be achieved regardless of IPR strength, and
there is no way that weak IPR enforcement can strictly increase social surplus. Withholding arises when information
is asymmetric, and IPR enforcement strength matters because it affects both the scale of withholding and the social
surplus in each withheld segment.
¥ Multinational’s payoff
13To complete the picture, we need to not only consider the impact of IPR enforcement on social welfare given
technology development, but we also need to examine how IPR enforcement affects the multinational’s decision for
developing such a technology in the ﬁr s tp l a c e .T od os o ,w eﬁrst consider the multinational’s ﬁrst-period payoff (the
second-period payoff does not depend on the enforcement strength in the ﬁrst period). The impact of enforcement
strength on technology development will be discussed subsequently.
Ml always licenses in all segments in the ﬁrst period. When the enforcement changes from strong to weak, it
has to lower the license fee in each segment from ul to γ1ul + d,s ot h a tMl earns less under weak enforcement:
π1
l(s)=s1(ul − cl) >s 1(γ1ul + d − cl)=π1
l(w).F o rMh,i te a r n s
π1
h(s)=
∙
s1 −
δs2(uh − ul)
ul − cl
¸
(ul − ch)
in the ﬁrst period under strong enforcement, and
π1
h(w)=
∙
s1 −
δs2(uh − ul)
d − cl
¸
(d − ch)+s1γ1ul
under weak enforcement. Note that π1
h(s) does not depend on γ1,w h e r e a sπ1
h(w) is a linear, increasing function of
γ1. We can further show that π1
h(s) >π 1
h(w) when γ1 =0and π1
h(s) <π 1
h(w) when γ1 = γ0.
Proposition 4 When the ﬁrst-period enforcement changes from weak to strong, Ml earns more proﬁt, whereas Mh
e a r n sl e s sp r o ﬁt if and only if γ1 ∈ [γ∗,γ0) for some γ∗ ∈ (0,γ0).
Proposition 4 highlights one of the key results of this paper, that is, the gains in social surplus brought about by
weak IPR enforcement can be shared by the high type multinational (but not the low type). When IPR enforcement
is strong, Mh withholds from some segments and therefore loses proﬁts there. When IPR enforcement is weak, Mh
withholds from more segments and earns less in a licensed segment, as it has to charge a lower license fee to D
in order to prevent it from stealing. However, Mh’s payoff in a withheld segment is increased, as it receives some
compensation for D’s stealing. Within the regime of weak enforcement, Mh’s payoff increases with the strength
of IPR enforcement (γ1), i.e., it prefers IPR enforcement to be (marginally) stronger. Across the regimes of weak
and strong enforcement, though, Mh’s payoff is higher under weak enforcement than under strong enforcement if
the strength of weak enforcement is sufﬁciently strong. Consider the case in which γ1 is slightly below γ0.B yt h e
deﬁnition of γ0, D can expect to earn almost zero from stealing. This means that Mh’s proﬁt in a licensed segment is
not reduced. The comparison of Mh’s payoff then boils down to a tradeoff between larger per-segment loss of proﬁt
under strong enforcement and larger withholding scale under weak enforcement. Given that D (and consumers) is
receiving zero surplus, Mh’s per-segment proﬁt equals social surplus in the segment. Therefore, the conclusion is the
14same as with social surplus: Mh’s ﬁrst period payoff is higher under weak enforcement.
¥ Innovation and technology portfolio
Conventional wisdom, which is in favor of strong IPR enforcement in developing countries, maintains that strong
enforcement provides multinationals with incentives to develop technologies and products that will ultimately bene-
ﬁt developing countries. The argument is based on the premise that multinationals’ proﬁts will be lower when IPR
enforcement becomes weaker. This may be the case in a conventional setting without any market imperfection. How-
ever, as shown above, when there is some form of market imperfection such as information asymmetry, weaker IPR
may generate not only more surplus for society but also more proﬁt for the (high type) multinationals. Moreover,
because IPR enforcement strength affects the two types of multinationals differently, the technology portfolio facing
the developing country may also change in response to the enforcement strength.
Imagine that after Nature determines its type, the multinational has to choose the likelihood that its technology will
be successfully developed, vi ∈ [0,1],a tac o s to fφ
v2
i
2 ,w h e r eφ is some large constant that ensures an interior solution
for the optimal choice, v∗
i .L e tπ
j
i ≡ π1
i(j)+δπ2
i(j) be type i’s two-period total proﬁts under enforcement regime j,
where i = h,l and j = s,w. Then, Mi chooses vi to maximize viπ
j
i − φ
v2
i
2 , and the optimal choice is v∗
i =
π
j
i
φ .L e t
ρ>0 be the probability that M = Mh by Nature’s choice. Then the probability that a technology is developed at all
is ρ
π
j
h
φ +( 1− ρ)
π
j
l
φ under regime j. Hence, strong IPR enforcement is more likely to generate a technology suitable
for the developing country than weak enforcement if and only if
ρ
πs
h
φ
+( 1− ρ)
πs
l
φ
>ρ
πw
h
φ
+( 1− ρ)
πw
l
φ
,
or
(1 − ρ)(πs
l − πw
l ) >ρ (πw
h − πs
h).
Since πw
h −πs
h = π1
h(w)−π1
h(s) > 0 for γ1 ∈ [γ∗,γ0) while πs
l −πw
l = π1
l(s)−π1
l(w)=0when γ1 = γ0,w e
conclude:
Corollary 1 Weak enforcement is more likely to generate technologies for developing countries than strong enforce-
ment if and only if
(a) γ1 >γ (ρ) for some γ(ρ) ∈ [γ∗,γ0) for any given ρ; and likewise
(b) ρ>ρ (γ1) for some ρ(γ1) ∈ (0,1] for any given γ1 ∈ (γ∗,γ0).
Corollary 1 brings forward two important implications in contrast to conventional wisdom. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h e
corollary suggests that regardless of the value of ρ, that is, regardless of how likely the multinational is a high type to
begin with, there always exists some moderately weak form of IPR enforcement more likely to develop a technology
15suitable for the developing country than strong IPR enforcement. The second part implies that moderately weak
enforcement is more likely to develop a technology for the developing country than strong enforcement, provided that
the likelihood of the multinational being the high type is large enough.
We can now reinterpret ρ0, the aforementioned ap r i o r iprobability that M = Mh, as the conditional probability of
the multinational being a high type given that it has developed a technology for the developing country. In accordance,
ρ0 reﬂectstheex ante reputationofthemultinationalanticipatedbylocalconsumersandcanthereforebeendogenously
determined as
ρ0 =
ρπ
j
h
ρπ
j
h +( 1− ρ)π
j
l
under enforcement regime j. The multinational enjoys better initial reputation under strong enforcement if and only if
πw
l
πs
l >
πw
h
πs
h . Because πw
h >π s
h for γ1 ∈ [γ∗,γ0) while πs
l >π w
l for any γ1 ≤ γ0, it is apparent that the multinational
enjoys better ex ante reputation when the weak strength γ1 is in the range of [γ∗,γ0) than when enforcement is strong.
Moreover, since both
πw
l
πs
l and
πw
h
πs
h are linear and increasing in γ1, we can further conclude:
Corollary 2 There exists γ∗∗ ∈ [0,γ∗) such that the multinational enjoys a better ex ante reputation, i.e., a higher
ρ0, under weak enforcement than under strong enforcement if and only if the weak strength satisﬁes γ1 >γ ∗∗.
Corollary 2 suggests that upon entering the developing country, the multinational will be endowed with a better
reputation under weak enforcement even when the weak enforcement hurts the incentive for technology development
for both types (i.e., when γ1 ∈ (γ∗∗,γ∗)). This is because weak IPR enforcement hurts the low type’s incentive more
than it hurts the high type. Hence, conditional on the multinational entering the market with a technology, it is more
like to be the high type under weak enforcement than under strong enforcement.
5 Enforcement Cost
So far we have developed a simple model of IPR enforcement under information asymmetry. While our theoretical
results roughly correspond to empirical evidence found in the existing literature, the match is imperfect because within
the weak and strong enforcement regime, the scale of entry and the level of social surplus are constant regardless of
the enforcement strength. To generate theoretical predictions that better match empirical observations, we extend the
main model by introducing the cost of enforcement and allowing such a cost to vary across segments.
In the main model, enforcement, while imperfect, is assumed to be costless. In this section, we assume instead
that the multinational has to incur a positive cost in order to initiate the IPR enforcement process. The cost reﬂects
resources the multinational has to engage, including time, money, paperwork and personnel, in order for the legal
authority to launch an investigation. Once an investigation is launched, the probability of successfully convict the
16copycat and obtain the compensation remains to be γ. Furthermore, we assume that the enforcement cost may differ
across segments. This may be the case when the cost and competency of local lawyers or the level of government red
tape differs from city to city. Without loss of generality, we assume that the enforcement cost in segment j, ωj,i s
increasing in j. We also assume for simplicity that the cost is independent of M’s type, that newly emerging segments
in the second period are indexed higher than the ﬁrst period segments, and that γ0ul >ω s2. The last assumption
ensures that when the enforcement is strong, M would be willing to incur the enforcement cost in any segment should
stealing take place there. As in the main model, the enforcement in the second period is assumed to be strong and
accordingly no stealing takes place in the second period. Our ensuing analysis focuses on the ﬁrst period.
When stealing takes place in the ﬁr s tp e r i o di ns e g m e n tj, M will start the enforcement process if and only if
γ1ul ≥ ωj. Let j be the segment in which M is indifferent between starting the enforcement process or not. Note
that j depends on the strength of enforcement, γ1.S i n c eωj is increasing in j,w eh a v ej ∈ [0,j) as an enforceable
segment and j ∈ [j,s 1] as an unenforceable segment. If Mi chooses to enter an enforceable segment, it offers the
technology to D at a licensing fee of γ1ul + d and earns a payoff that equals γ1ul + d − ci.I fMi chooses to enter
an unenforceable segment, it has to offer the technology to D at a lower licensing fee of d and thus earns a payoff of
d−ci. In such a segment, the effective enforcement strength becomes zero. If Mi decides to withhold from a segment,
its expected payoff is γ1ul − ωj if the segment is enforceable and 0 if it is unenforceable.
The following result describes the entry choices made by the two types of M in the ﬁrst period.16
Proposition 5 There exists a separating equilibrium, in which during the ﬁrst period,
(a) Ml licenses in all segments while Mh licenses in some segments and withholds from the remaining segments;
(b) Mh withholds from all unenforceable segments before it withholds from any enforceable segment;
(c) Mh withholds from an enforceable segment with a smaller enforcement cost before it withholds from an en-
forceable segment with a larger enforcement cost.
As in the main model, condition (8), which we continue to assume, ensures that no pooling equilibrium exists. In
a separating equilibrium, Ml enters all segments, even in those where Ml will not be willing to start the enforcement
process should stealing take place. This is simply because licensing is more efﬁcient than stealing (d>c l) and,
therefore, Ml will offer a licensing contract attractive enough for D to accept and hence to give up stealing, in which
case the enforcement cost becomes irrelevant.
To differentiate itself from Ml, Mh has to withhold from some segments. Proposition 5 highlights the order of
Mh’s withholding, which is non-monotonic in the enforcement cost. Mh ﬁrst withholds from unenforceable segments,
i.e., those segments where the enforcement cost is so high that Mh will not seek enforcement after stealing takes place.
16The equilibrium is not unique only when all withholding happens among unenforceable segments and it is only because Mh is indifferent as to
the identity of withheld segments (the measure of withheld segments remains unique).
17In each of these segments, D steals and gets away unpunished. Should withholding from thesesegments be insufﬁcient
tosignalitstype, Mh further withholdsfromenforceablesegments, whereitwillbattleagainstD forIPRinfringement.
The reason that Mh ﬁrst withholds from unenforceable segments is as follows. Withholding from an unenforceable
segment reduces the payoff of Mh by d − ch and that of Ml by d − cl. Withholding from an enforceable segment, j,
reduces the payoff of Mh by γul +d−ch −(γul −ωj)=d−ch +ωj and that of Ml by d−cl +ωj.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
withholding from an enforceable segment involves a larger opportunity cost for Mh (which is bad for Mh), as well as
a larger opportunity cost for Ml (which is good for Mh because it reduces the scale of withholding) than withholding
from an unenforceable segment. As before, Mh prefers a situation in which both opportunity costs are smaller, i.e.,
withholding from unenforceable segments ﬁrst.
Among enforceable segments, Mh ﬁrst withholds from those with lower enforcement costs. This can be similarly
explained: the per-segment opportunity cost of withholding for Mi is d − ci + ωj,a n dMh prefers lower opportunity
cost, namely smaller ωj.
Whether Mh withholds from unenforceable segments only or from some enforceable segments as well depends,
among other things, upon the strength of enforcement, γ1. It is easy to show that when s1 − j(γ1) ≥ δs2 uh−ul
d−cl (i.e.,
when γ1 is very small), it is sufﬁcient for Mh to withhold only from unenforceable segments. Otherwise, Mh has
to withhold from some enforceable segments as well. As an increase in γ1 increases j and shrinks the measure of
unenforceable segments, Mh starts to withhold from enforceable segments. Because the opportunity cost of withhold-
ing from an unenforceable segment for Ml is smaller than from an enforceable segment, the increase in the scale of
withholding from enforceable segments must be smaller than the reduction in the measure of unenforceable segments.
With sufﬁcient improvement in IPR enforcement, all segments become enforceable while stealing continues in any
segment that Mh chooses to withdraw from. Further improvement, i.e., when γ1 ≥ γ0, deters D from stealing. By the
assumption that γ0ul >ω s2, it can be shown that the scale of withholding by Mh when all segments are enforceable
is bounded below when the enforcement becomes strong. The next proposition summarizes this implication.
Proposition 6 Suppose that γ0ul >ω s1. As the strength of IPR enforcement improves, Mh enters (weakly) more
segments, and strictly so when γ1 satisﬁes the condition s1 − j(γ1) <δ s 2 uh−ul
d−cl .
The implication highlighted in Proposition 6 differs from the prediction obtained from the main model, which
suggests a constant level of entry by Mh as long as enforcement remains weak. Proposition 6 therefore better matches
empirical ﬁndings in the literature (Maskus and Penubarti (1995), Branstetter, et al (2006), Branstetter, et al (2007),
and Du, et al (2008)). Notice that in Proposition 6, better IPR enforcement encourages entry not because it provides
more incentives for technology development by the multinational. Instead, given a technology, Mh decides to make
the technology legally available (via licensing) in (weakly) more segments when IPR enforcement is improved. Hence
the driving force for the phenomenon is the need for signaling: a larger γ1 allows Mh to withhold from fewer segments
18in its attempt to separate itself from Ml.
Despite the expansion of entry, improved IPR enforcement does not lead to an increase in social welfare, in
contrast to what conventional wisdom would suggest. When the enforcement is sufﬁciently weak, that is, when
s1 − j(γ1) ≥ δs2 uh−ul
d−cl , Mh will not withhold from any enforceable segment. In this case, a small improvement
in IPR enforcement has no impact on the scale of withholding and hence on social welfare, since in any segment
that Mh withholds from, Mh will not incur an enforcement cost. As improved enforcement turns unenforceable
segments into enforceable segments and induces Mh to increasingly withhold from enforceable segments, the social
surplus diminishes. To see this, note that the withholding from an unenforceable segment gives rise to a social cost of
d − ch, or the cost difference between stealing and licensing. Withholding from an enforceable segment, j,h o w e v e r ,
induces a social cost of d − ch + ωj. The additional cost, ωj, is incurred because Mh will resort to the enforcement
mechanism to claim its share from the copycat. When the improved enforcement reduces the measure of withholding
from unenforceable segments by y, Mh will increase the measure of withholding from enforceable segments by, say,
x.L e t X represent the additional enforceable segments that Mh withholds from. The change in social surplus is
therefore:
(y − x)(d − ch) −
Z
X
ωjdj.
However, in order to separate itself from Ml, Mh must choose X, and hence x, in such a way that Ml has no incentive
to mimic. This turns out to require:
(y − x)(d − cl) −
Z
X
ωjdj =0 .
Since ch <c l, the resulting change in social surplus due to an improvement in enforcement is negative.
Proposition 7 Social surplus under weak enforcement is weakly decreasing in γ1.
Furthermore, in the case when s1 − j(γ1) ≥ δs2 uh−ul
d−cl and hence Mh withholds from unenforceable segments
only, noenforcementcostisincurredinequilibrium. Asa result, the scaleofwithholdingbyMh inthiscaseisthesame
as in the main model when there is no enforcement cost. Recall Proposition 3, which states that (without enforcement
cost) weak enforcement generates more social surplus than strong enforcement. Applying the result here, we can then
conclude that even with enforcement cost, social surplus generated under weak enforcement (if it is sufﬁciently weak)
is higher than under strong enforcement.
When enforcement is still weak but close to strong (i.e., when γ1 is close to γ0), we know from the analysis above
that the scale of withholding by Mh is bounded below by that under strong enforcement, as the cost of enforcement
is assumed to be bounded above by γ0ul. In fact, it can be shown that the scale of withholding by Mh approaches
the lower bound when the enforcement cost in each segment approaches the upper bound. This implies that when
the enforcement cost in each segment approaches its upper limit, the social surplus generated under moderately weak
19enforcement can fall below that under strong enforcement. On the other hand, if the enforcement cost in each segment
is sufﬁciently small, we again know from the analysis of the main model that the social surplus thus obtained must be
higher than that under strong enforcement.
We therefore conclude:
Proposition 8 Suppose that γ0ul >ω s1. Compared to that under strong enforcement, social surplus under weak
enforcement
(a) is higher when γ1 satisﬁes the condition s1 − j(γ1) ≥ δs2 uh−ul
d−cl ;
( b )i sh i g h e r( l o w e r )w h e nγ1 is sufﬁciently close to γ0 if ωj is sufﬁciently small (large) for all j ∈ [0,s 1].
Together, Propositions 6, 7, and 8 bring caution to the policy implications to be derived from empirical ﬁndings in
the literature. Even if better IPR enforcement promotes multinationals’ entry into developing countries, this may not
serve as evidence in support of IPR improvement in an economy that suffers from various forms of market imperfec-
tion.
While Propositions 7 and 8 appear to paint a rather grim picture regarding IPR enforcement, it should be noted that
both results are obtained under the condition that the multinational has already developed a technology for the market.
To properly evaluate the effect of IPR enforcement, we once again need to look at its impact on the multinational’s
payoff.
Proposition 9 Suppose that γ0ul >ω s1. Then,
(a) the payoff of Ml is (weakly) increasing in γ1 ∈ [0,1];
(b) the payoff of Mh is (weakly) increasing in γ1 if s1 − j(γ1) ≥ δs2 uh−ul
d−cl ;
(c) compared to that under strong enforcement, the payoff of Mh is lower when γ1 =0and there exists γ∗∗ ∈
(0,γ0) such that the payoff of Mh is higher when γ1 ∈ [γ∗∗,γ0).
As in the main model, the payoff of Ml increases when the enforcement is improved. Recall that Ml licenses in
all segments, earning γ1ul + d − cl in an enforceable segment and d − cl in an unenforceable segment. It gains from
improved enforcement for two reasons. First, the measure of enforceable segments is enlarged, and Ml earns more
in an enforceable segment than in an unenforceable segment. Second, in an enforceable segment, Ml enjoys a larger
proﬁt because it can charge a higher license fee to D due to the improved enforcement.
Improved IPR enforcement also increases Mh’s payoff when Mh withholds only from unenforceable segments.
In such a case, a marginal improvement of enforcement does not affect the scale of withholding; it only expands the
measure of enforceable segments. Accordingly, Mh gains from both the enlarged measure of enforceable segments
and the higher licensing fee in any given enforceable segment, just like in the case of Ml.
20When Mh begins to withhold from enforceable segments, better enforcement has an additional effect: it allows Mh
to reduce the scale of its withholding. This turns out to be costly for Mh. The reason is as follows. The withholding
by Mh has to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint such that Ml does not mimic the withholding. The cost
of withholding from an enforceable segment is d − cl + ωj for Ml and is d − ch + ωj for Mh,s oMh enjoys a cost
advantage in withholding over Ml by the amount of ch − cl, which is turned into Mh’s proﬁt in a withheld segment.
Accordingly, conditional on Ml not mimicking Mh, Mh’s payoff is reduced in the withheld segments due to the
decreased scale of withholding. Of course, in licensed segments and in segments that are turned from withholding to
licensing, Mh’s proﬁt still increases due to improved enforcement. The net effect is unclear.
Nevertheless, it remains true that Mh has a higher payoff under moderately weak enforcement (and a lower payoff
under extremely weak enforcement) than under strong enforcement. Under moderately weak enforcement (when γ1
approaches γ0 from below), allsegmentsbecomeenforceable. Inthemainmodel withzeroenforcement cost, weknow
that Mh makes more proﬁt under moderately weak enforcement than under strong enforcement. The comparison
therefore must remain true when enforcement costs are sufﬁciently small. When enforcement costs approach their
upper limit, the scale of withholding gets close to that under strong enforcement, as suggested earlier. In each segment
where Mh offers licensing, Mh earns γ1ul + d − ch, which approaches ul − ch when γ1 approaches γ0.I n e a c h
segment where Mh withholds, Mh earns γ1ul − ωj.W h e nωj approaches its upper limit, the earning by Mh in such
a segment approaches that under strong enforcement as well. Therefore, the total proﬁtf o rMh when the enforcement
cost approaches its upper limit approaches that under strong enforcement. Since the equilibrium payoff of Mh is
decreasinginenforcementcostsinwithheldsegments, Mh willmake more proﬁts under moderatelyweakenforcement
than under strong enforcement.
6 Competing Domestic Firms
One of our assumptions in the main model is that the multinational can contract with the single local ﬁrm, which is also
the only potential copycat, in each segment. While allowing such a contract helps explain the fundamental question
of why welfare gains achieved under weak IPR enforcement cannot be replicated under strong enforcement, it may
also invite questions as to whether contracting is possible at all under weak enforcement. To examine the issue, we
return to the main model and assume zero enforcement cost in all segments. Instead of a single domestic ﬁrm in each
segment, however, we now assume many domestic ﬁrms in each segment. These ﬁrms all have the capability to steal
the multinational’s technology and compete in the product market al aBertrand. We assume that the multinational
is able to identify, and hence contract with, only one local ﬁrm in each segment.17 This alternative setting obviously
17This is equivalent to a setting in which a domestic ﬁrm from a segment can sell its product to another segment when the technology is stolen.
We choose the current setting for expositional simplicity.
21better reﬂects the reality in a developing country. We want to investigate how this alternative assumption alters the
qualitative results we obtained earlier.
As before, a domestic ﬁrm which steals the technology can expect to earn (1 − γ)q − d if it charges price q.T h e
break-even price is therefore q = d
1−γ.W h e n γ>γ 0 ≡ 1 − d
ul, q>u l, i.e., the break-even price is beyond the
consumers’ willingness to pay. Hence, as in the main model, a domestic ﬁrm can never sell the product for a proﬁta n d
hence will not steal when enforcement is strong. In such a case, both M and domestic ﬁrms earn zero in a segment in
which M withholds. In a segment where Mi licenses to a domestic ﬁrm, since the licensee does not face competition
from other domestic ﬁrms, it will charge a price of ul in the product market. As a result, Mi will charge a license fee
that equals ul,a n dMi’s payoff is ul − ci while the licensee’s payoff is zero. As both parties’ payoffs are the same as
in the main model, Proposition 1 holds.
When the ﬁrst period IPR enforcement is weak (γ1 ≤ γ0), in a segment where Mi withholds, Bertrand competition
among domestic ﬁrms implies that all domestic ﬁrms will charge a price equal to d
1−γ1 and expect to earn zero proﬁt.
Since each segment has a unit demand, the total earning made by all of these domestic ﬁrms equals d
1−γ1,w h i c h
is transferred to Mi with probability γ1 through IPR enforcement. Hence, Mi’s expected payoff is
γ1d
1−γ1 in such a
segment. In a segment where Mi identiﬁes a domestic ﬁrm and licenses to it the technology, the licensee will set its
price equal to d
1−γ1 to weed out competition from other domestic ﬁrms who may steal the technology. The licensee
can certainly opt to refuse the license and instead steals Mi’s technology, in which case it will make zero proﬁta sa
result of Bertrand competition against other domestic ﬁrms. Accordingly, the licensee’s outside option has a value of
zero. Realizing this, Mi will charge a license fee that equals d
1−γ1, earning an expected payoff of d
1−γ1 −ci. Therefore,
Mi’s two-period total proﬁti s
πi(y1,ρ 1
i)=y1
µ
d
1 − γ1 − ci
¶
+( s1 − y1)
γ1d
1 − γ1 + δπ2
i
= y1(d − ci)+s1 γ1d
1 − γ1 + δ{s2[ρ1
iuh +( 1− ρ1
i)ul] − k}.
Comparing the expression with equation (7) when there is only one domestic ﬁrm in each segment, we note that the
only difference is in the term s1γ1 d
1−γ1 in the case of multiple domestic ﬁrms as opposed to s1γ1ul in the case of a
single domestic ﬁrm. The term, however, does not affect the choice of y1 by either Mh or Ml. Therefore, Proposition
2 continues to hold.
In other words, the number of potential copycats in a market has no effect on the equilibrium choice of entry by the
multinational. As a result, the social welfare comparison (Propositions 3) remains the same as before. The presence
of competition among copycats under weak enforcement only reduces the equilibrium payoffs of both Mh and Ml by
s1γ1(ul − d
1−γ1). Notice that this payoff reduction is small when enforcement is moderately weak (i.e., when γ1 is
22close to γ0). In such a case, all competing domestic ﬁrms will charge a price close to what a single domestic ﬁrm
will charge without competition. When the enforcement becomes extremely weak (i.e., when γ1 is close to zero), the
payoff reduction is also small because the multinational can hardly expect any transfer from copycats whether there is
one or many copycats.
Turningnowtothecomparison of themultinational’s payoff betweenweakandstrongenforcement, we notethat as
in the case of a single domestic ﬁrm in each segment, Ml is always hurt by the weak enforcement. In fact, competition
among domestic ﬁrms only compounds the damage of weak enforcement on Ml, as we have highlighted above. As for
Mh, although the competition among copycats also reduces its payoff under weak enforcement, it remains true that
there exists some rangeof weak enforcement under which Mh earns more than under strong enforcement.18 Therefore,
the qualitative result of Proposition 4 continues to hold.
Although competition among copycats does not alter the qualitative results of most of our previous results, by
reducing the equilibrium payoffs of both Mh and Ml by the same amount, the competition changes the technology
portfolio. In particular, it becomes less likely that the multinational, whether the high type or the low type, is able
to bring a technology to the developing country. The impact on ρ0, the initial reputation that the multinational is
endowed with when it enters the market, is less straightforward. It can be veriﬁed that πh <π l whether the ﬁrst period
enforcement is strong or weak. As the competition reduces the equilibrium payoff of both Mh and Ml by the same
amount, it can be shown that πh
πl decreases, implying that the incentive of technology development is damaged more
for Mh than for Ml and, as a result, the multinational will begin with a worse reputation in the ﬁrst period.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have demonstrated in this paper that, when a country suffers from some forms of market failure, perfect IPR en-
forcement may serve the interest of neither the country nor the foreign multinationals transferring technology to that
country. Instead, moderately weak enforcement can do better for both parties. However, extremely weak enforcement
beneﬁts the country at the expense of the foreign multinationals and is therefore likely to hurt the country ultimately
when the incentives of technology development by foreign multinationals are taken into account. Although the norma-
tive results of our analysis depart from conventional wisdom that often advocates more stringent IPR enforcement in
developing countries, the positive results of this paper match well with empirical observations that have been thought
to support conventional wisdom. This not only makes our analysis relevant, but also raises doubts as to whether
18Mh’s ﬁrst-period payoff under weak enforcement becomes
π1
h(w)=

s1 −
δs2(uh − ul)
d − cl

(d − ch)+s1 γ1d
1 − γ1 ,
which is increasing γ1 with π1
h(s) >π 1
h(w) at γ1 =0and π1
h(s) <π 1
h(w) at γ1 = γ0.
23the right policy implications have been drawn upon empirical facts when it comes to enforcing IPR in a developing
country.
The particular form of market imperfection we have focused on is information asymmetry between foreign multi-
nationals and local consumers concerning the quality of the former’s technology. We have stressed in the Introduction
the pertinence of this form of market imperfection to a developing country. Focusing on this particular form of market
imperfection allows our analysis to be more efﬁcient—we can simultaneously explain why the Pareto gains achieved
under moderately weak enforcement cannot be attained under strong enforcement through a contractual arrangement.
It will be useful to think of other forms of market imperfection that may prevent foreign multinationals from entering
a developing country even under strong enforcement. However, it is likely to be challenging to simultaneously ad-
dress why weak enforcement brings welfare gains and why such gains cannot be replicated under strong enforcement
through contracting.
According to our analysis, information asymmetry, and hence the need for signaling, induces foreign multina-
tionals with better technologies to partially delay their entry into developing countries. The delay is driven by the
assumption that initial entry is more costly, and therefore withholding is less costly, for a multinational with better
technologies. As explained earlier, we deem the assumption realistic. More importantly, the qualitative results of
our analysis hold even without such an assumption. Should we alternatively assume that multinationals with better
technologies gain more from maintaining their images, we would arrive at same conclusions even when the licensing
cost is the same across types of multinationals.
Finally, we have assumed that second-period IPR enforcement is always strong. While the assumption is adopted
to simplify the exposition of our analysis, it is more realistic to assume some form of weak enforcement in the second
period as well. While it will be interesting to discuss, for example, the dynamic implications of better IPR enforcement
using this alternative assumption, such an exercise will not change our analysis qualitatively and we choose to not
incorporate it here.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
If the two types are separated in the ﬁrst period, they will choose their ﬁrst best action in the second period, which
is to invest in all segments. If the two types are not separated in the ﬁrst period, we show below that they cannot
separate in the second period, either. Suppose the contrary is true, i.e., the two types take different actions in the
second period. Given Assumption 3 (k<s 2cl), Ml c a nd on ow o r s eb yi n v e s t i n gi na l ls e g m e n t s .H e n c e ,x2
l = s2
24and x2
h <s 2. The following incentive compatibility conditions must hold
s2ul ≥ x2
huh + y2
h(ul − cl),
s2ul ≤ x2
huh + y2
h(ul − ch).
Since ch >c l, these two conditions cannot hold simultaneously.
Meanwhile, a pooling equilibrium where both types invest in all segments (x2
l = x2
h = s2) clearly exists. There
does not exist any deviation (x∗,y∗) with the corresponding (off-equilibrium) belief ρ∗ such that it would be proﬁtable
for the high type to deviate but not for the low type to do so. This is because, should
s2[ρ2uh +( 1− ρ2)ul] ≤ x∗[ρ∗uh +( 1− ρ∗)ul]+y∗(ul − ch)
hold, we have
s2[ρ2uh +( 1− ρ2)ul] ≤ x∗[ρ∗uh +( 1− ρ∗)ul]+y∗(ul − cl)
as well, given that cl <c h.
In fact, there exists a continuum of pooling equilibria with x2 ≤ s2. They are supported by the off-equilibrium
belief that only Ml deviates. Given this belief, either type must do no worse than invest in all segments and be regarded
as the low type. That is,
x2[ρ2uh +( 1− ρ2)ul] − k + y2(ul − ci) ≥ s2ul − k
for i = h,l. Given our equilibrium selection criterion, the two types choose the most efﬁcient pooling outcome,
namely x2
l = x2
h = s2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst show that a pooling equilibrium does not exist. Suppose there is a pooling equilibrium. Then either type of
M can do no worse than licensing in all segments in the ﬁrst period and investing in all segments (and being regarded
as the low type) in the second period. In particular, πl(y1,ρ 0) ≥ πl(s1,0).D e ﬁne ˜ y1 such that πl(˜ y1,1) = πl(y1,ρ 0).
Then, πl(˜ y1,1) ≥ πl(s1,0), which means ˜ y1 > 0 given that s1
s2 >δ uh−ul
ul−cl . ˜ y1 is a deviation that gives Ml its
equilibrium payoff should consumers assign an off-equilibrium belief that ρ1(˜ y1)=1 .
Totally differentiating the proﬁt πi(y1,ρ 1
i) in (5) with respect to y1 and ρ1
i,w eh a v e
dρ
1
i
dy1 = − ul−ci
δs2(uh−ul). Since
ch >c l,w eh a v e ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dρ1
h
dy1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dρ1
l
dy1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯.
25Therefore, the iso-proﬁtc u r v e so fMh and Ml satisfy the single-crossing property. As a result, there exists  >0
with ˜ y1 −  >0 such that πl(˜ y1 −  ,1) <π l(y1,ρ 0) whereas πh(˜ y1 −  ,1) >π h(y1,ρ 0). In other words, there
exists a feasible deviation ˜ y1 −   from which Ml can never proﬁt even if consumers assign the most favorable belief
following such a deviation, whereas Mh can proﬁt under some posterior belief of consumers. Accordingly, the pooling
equilibrium does not meet the intuitive criterion.
Now, consider the possibility of a separating equilibrium. By the usual argument, Ml licenses in all segments in
the ﬁrst period and invests in all segments in the second, thus earning a proﬁt
πl(s1,0) = s1(ul − cl)+δ(s2ul − k).
Mh licenses in y1
h segments in the ﬁrst period and invests in all segments in the second period. For Ml not to mimic
Mh,w em u s th a v eπl(s1,0) ≥ πl(y1
h,1),o r
s1(ul − cl)+δ(s2ul − k) ≥ y1
h(ul − cl)+δ(s2uh − k),
from which we ﬁnd y1
h = s1 −
δs2(uh−ul)
ul−cl <s 1. Given (6), y1
h > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Note that ul − ch >d − ch and so s1 −
δs
2(uh−ul)
ul−cl >s 1 −
δs
2(uh−ul)
d−cl . Thus, when γ1 =0 , π1
h(s)=
h
s1 −
δs2(uh−ul)
ul−cl
i
(ul − ch) >
h
s1 −
δs2(uh−ul)
d−cl
i
(d − ch)=π1
h(w). Also note that d−ch
d−cl < uh−ch
ul−cl . Hence,
when γ1 = γ0, π1
h(w)=s1(ul − ch) − δs2(uh − ul)d−ch
d−cl >s 1(ul − ch) − δs2(uh − ul)ul−ch
ul−cl = π1
h(s). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
We begin by showing that no pooling equilibrium exists under condition (8). Suppose pooling in the ﬁrst pe-
riod with both types withdrawing from Le ⊆ [0,j(γ1)) enforceable segments and Ln ⊆ [j(γ1),s 1] unenforceable
segments. Mi’s two-period payoff is then
πi(Le,L n,ρ 0)=( j − kLek)(γ1ul + d − ci)+
Z
Le
(γ1ul − ωj)dj +( s1 − j − kLnk)(d − ci)
+δ[s2(ρ0(uh − ul)+ul) − k]
= jγ1ul + s1(d − ci) −
Z
Le
(d − ci + ωj)dj −
Z
Ln
(d − ci)dj + δ[s2(ρ0(uh − ul)+ul) − k],
26where kLk is the measure of L. This equilibrium exists only if
πi(Le,L n,ρ 0) ≥ πi(∅,∅,0).
The equilibrium must also satisfy the intuitive criterion, that is, there does not exist L0
e ⊆ [0,j) and L0
n ⊆ [j,s 1] such
that
πl(Le,L n,ρ 0) ≥ πl(L0
e,L 0
n,1)
while at the same time there exists ρ1(L0
e,L 0
n) such that
πh(Le,L n,ρ 0) ≤ πh(L0
e,L 01
n(L0
e,L 0
n)).
When condition (8) holds, there exists L0
e,L 0
n, with L0
e ⊇ Le, L0
n ⊇ Ln,a n dL0
e ∪ L0
n 6=[ 0 ,s 1], such that
πl(Le,L n,ρ 0)=πl(L0
e,L 0
n,1).
To see this, note that when Ml withdraws from all enforceable segments, its payoff under the belief ρ1 =1equals:
πl([0,j),[j,s 1],1) = jγ1ul + s1(d − cl) −
Z j
0
(d − cl + ωj)dj − (s1 − j)(d − cl)+δ(s2uh − k)
= jγ1ul −
Z j
0
ωjdj + δ(s2uh − k),
which is less than
πl(∅,∅,0) = jγ1ul + s1(d − cl)+δ(s2ul − k),
givencondition(8). Since πl([0,j),[j,s 1],1) <π l(∅,∅,0) andsinceπl(∅,∅,0) ≤ πl(Le,L n,ρ 0),t h e r ee x i s t sL0
e,L 0
n,
with L0
e ⊇ Le, L0
n ⊇ Ln,a n dL0
e ∪ L0
n 6=[ 0 ,s 1], such that
πl(Le,L n,ρ 0)=πl(L0
e,L 0
n,1),
or
δs2(1 − ρ0)(uh − ul)=( kL0
ek + kL0
nk − kLek − kLnk)(d − cl)+
Z
L0
e
ωjdj +
Z
Le
ωjdj.
27Since L0
e ⊇ Le, L0
n ⊇ Ln, kL0
ek + kL0
nk − kLek − kLnk > 0. Hence,
δs2(1 − ρ0)(uh − ul) > (kL0
ek + kL0
nk − kLek − kLnk)(d − ch)+
Z
L0
e
ωjdj +
Z
Le
ωjdj.
That is, there exists ρ1(L0
e,L 0
n) such that
πh(Le,L n,ρ 0) <π h(L0
e,L 01
n(L0
e,L 0
n)).
Contradiction.
We now turn to a separating equilibrium. It is evident that in such an equilibrium, Ml enters all the segments
and earns a two-period payoff of πl(∅,∅,0). In correspondence, Mh withdraws from, say, Le ⊆ [0,j) enforceable
segments and Ln ⊆ [j,s 1] unenforceable segments. The Le and Ln are chosen to
max
Le,Ln
πh(Le,L n,1) = jγ1ul + s1(d − ch) − (kLek + kLnk)(d − ch) −
Z
Le
ωjdj + δ(s2uh − k)
subject to the constraint that πl(∅,∅,0) ≥ πl(Le,L n,1),o r
(kLek + kLnk)(d − cl)+
Z
Le
ωjdj ≥ δs2(uh − ul).
It is straightforward to show that the constraint above must be binding for the optimal choice of Le and Ln.W e
thus rewrite the constraint as
(kLek + kLnk)(d − cl)+
Z
Le
ωjdj = δs2(uh − ul). (9)
Substituting (9) into Mh’s objective function, we can rewrite the constrained optimization problem as
max
Le,Ln
πh(Le,L n,1) = jγ1ul + s1(d − ch) − δs2(uh − ul)+( kLek + kLnk)(ch − cl)+δ(s2uh − k) (10)
subject to (9). The following feature becomes apparent from the constrained optimization problem: Provided that
Le ⊂ [0,j) and Ln ⊆ [j,s 1] satisﬁes the constraint, Mh prefers Le ∪ Ln to be as large as possible.
This feature implies that Le = ∅ if Ln ⊂ [j,s 1].T h a ti s ,Mh must ﬁrst withdraw from unenforceable segments
before withdrawing from enforceable segments. To see this, suppose Le 6= ∅ and Ln ⊂ [j,s 1].T h e nMh can reduce
28Le slightly while keeping (9) binding by increasing Ln by a larger size. Doing so increases kLek + kLnk and hence
makes Mh better off. Contradiction.
The feature also implies that, when Le 6= ∅ (i.e., when Ln =[ j,s 1]), among enforceable segments, those with the
lowest enforcement costs are the ﬁrst to be withdrawn from. To see this, suppose the contrary is true. Then Mh can re-
place a given measure of enforceable segments with a larger measure of enforceable segments with lower enforcement
costs while maintaining constraint (9). Doing so increases kLek and in turn makes Mh better off. Contradiction.
Finally, the feature implies the possibility of a continuum of separating equilibria. In particular, when j satisﬁes
(s1 − j)(d − cl) ≥ δs2(uh − ul),
Mh withdrawing from any subset of unenforceable segments with kLnk(d − cl)=δs2(uh − ul) while Ml entering
all segments in the ﬁrst period constitutes a separating equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
As argued in the proof of Proposition 5, when γ1 ≤ γ0 and (s1 − j)(d − cl) ≥ δs2(uh − ul), Mh withholds only
from unenforceable segments with kLnk satisfying constraint (9). In this case, a marginal increase in γ1 has no effect
on the scale of withholding.
When γ1 ≤ γ0 and (s1 −j)(d−cl) <δ s 2(uh −ul), an increase in γ1 forces Ln to shrink. Then, from constraint
(9), it is evident that kLek must expand in correspondence but by a smaller magnitude. Hence, the total scale of
withholding decreases.
When γ1 increases to a level such that all segments become enforceable, constraint (9) is reduced to
kLek(d − cl)+
Z
Le
ωjdj = δs2(uh − ul).
Since ωj is increasing in j and since it is assumed that ωs2 <γ 0ul, kLek is bounded below by le,w h e r e
le(d − cl)+leγ0ul = δs2(uh − ul).
Since γ0ul = ul − d, le = δs2 uh−ul
ul−cl , which equals the scale of withholding when γ1 >γ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9
Parts (a) and (b) are straightforward from the constrained optimization problem (10). Part (c) is obtained by
making use of the following observations. First, provided that Le ⊂ [0,j) and Ln ⊆ [j,s 1] satisfy constraint (9), πh
is increasing in kLek + kLnk (see (10)). Second, when γ1 = γ0, j = s1, kLnk =0 ,w h e r e a skLek is bounded below
29by le obtained in the proof of Proposition 6. Substituting kLek with le, Mh’s payoff is then
πh = s1(γ1ul + d − ch) − δs2(uh − ul)+δs2uh − ul
ul − cl
(ch − cl)+δ(s2uh − k)
= s1(γ1ul + d − ch) − δs2(uh − ul)
ul − ch
ul − cl
+ δ(s2uh − k).
One can verify that πh equals the payoff of Mh under strong enforcement. Q.E.D.
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